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Abstract 
Discrete-choice experiments, while becoming increasingly popular, have rarely been tested 
for validity and reliability. This contribution purports to provide some evidence of a rather 
unique type. Two surveys designed to measure willingness-to-accept (WTA) for reform op-
tions in Swiss health care and health insurance are used to provide independent information 
with regard to two elements of reform. The issue to be addressed is whether WTA values 
converge although the three overlapping attributes (a more restrictive drug benefit, a delayed 
access to medical innovation, and a change in the monthly insurance premium) are embedded 
in widely differing choice sets. Experiment A contains rather radical health system reform 
options, while experiment B concentrates on more familiar elements such as copayment and 
the benefit catalogue. While mean WTA values differ between experiments, they tend to vary 
in similar ways, suggesting at least theoretical validity and reliability. 
Keywords: willingness-to-pay, discrete choice experiments, validity, reliability, framing ef-
fects 
JEL Codes: C35, C93, I11 
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1. Introduction 
In health economics, stated preference methods such as discrete-choice experiments (DCE) 
have been increasingly used to measure benefits. Applications of DCE to the valuation of 
health care programs have become numerous recently [1-3]. In a DCE, individuals are given a 
choice between hypothetical commodities. From the choices respondents make between the 
goods differing in product attributes, the researcher can derive the implicit trade-offs between 
these product attributes. This allows the computation of respondents' marginal utility for each 
product attribute. With the inclusion of a cost or price attribute, a money value can be calcu-
lated for each characteristic as well as for the entire good or program. The advantage of this 
approach over other stated preference methods such as e.g. the contingent-valuation method 
(CVM), lies in the fact that the price attribute is one among several, of which all vary in the 
course of the experiment. Biases that occur when individuals are asked about their willing-
ness-to-pay (WTP) directly are less likely to be observed in DCE [4]. Applications in health 
economics so far mainly comprised studies of WTP for different treatment methods [5-9] or 
different hospital or physician services [10-11]. DCEs like the present one, i.e. dealing with 
the health care system as a whole, are rare [12].  
DCEs usually are limited to a small number of attributes [1,13]. Especially when the product 
is defined as an entire health care system, this raises the question of whether neglected attrib-
utes influence the decisions of the respondents, causing bias in the WTP values obtained. Fur-
thermore, it is often unclear what specific effects certain reform proposals will have in prac-
tice, which makes the hypothetical character of the experiment more problematic. However, 
reliable and valid WTP values are of utmost importance if policy recommendations are to be 
derived from DCE studies [1]. 
This paper adds to the literature in two ways. First, it seeks to measure and analyze WTP (or 
rather, willingness-to-accept, WTA) values for proposed changes to an entire health care sys-
tem – a thing that has rarely been attempted thus far. Second, it benefits from the unique op-
portunity to conduct two parallel DCEs with two independent samples for addressing validity 
and reliability issues, made possible by the inclusion of three overlapping attributes in both 
DCEs. 
To the best knowledge of the authors, comparative DCEs were only conducted by Slothuus-
Skoldborg and Gyrd-Hansen [12], who analyzed WTP for screening methods for different 
types of cancer, and by Merino-Castellò [6], who studied the demand for two different drugs. 
In the field of environmental economics, DeShazo and Fermo [14] have undertaken two 
DCEs concerning national park attributes in two different countries. The aim of the present 
study is to examine whether differences in the attribute set describing a hypothetical product 
have an influence on preferences and WTP values of respondents. This can be tested thanks to 
an overlapping subset of attributes. 
This paper is structured as follows. Section 2 gives a brief overview of the underlying theory 
and methodology of a DCE. In section 3, reliability and validity issues are discussed and the 
pertinent literature reviewed. Section 4 explains the setup of the studies and the measures tak-
en to improve validity and reliability in the analysis. The estimation results of three model 
specifications are presented in section 5, where WTA values are also derived, followed by a 
discussion of the results with respect to reliability and validity. Section 6 concludes. 
2. Theoretical Background 
Based on random utility theory [15-17] and Lancaster's new demand theory [18], discrete-
choice experiments (DCEs) are designed to allow individuals to express their preferences for 
non-marketed and/or hypothetical goods that vary in their product characteristics. A rational 
individual will always choose the alternative with the higher level of utility. The decision-
making process within a DCE can thus be seen as a comparison of utility values  deter-
mined by  
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where  represents the indirect utility function of individual  for a good )(⋅v i j , described by a 
vector of attributes  and a price denoted by . The income of individual i  is , while 
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Here,  is the deterministic component of the utility that can be estimated, while the error 
term reflects unobservable factors that vary between individuals and alternatives. The utility 
function  can be inferred from observed choices by assuming that the probability  of 
choosing alternative 
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j  over , given the vector of attributes, equals the  probability of  occur-
rence of the utility difference, and therefore 
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The utility function is usually assumed to be linear,  
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where  is a constant, 0c Kββ ,...1  are the parameters to be estimated, and  are the 
different attributes of the commodity j. There is empirical evidence suggesting that a linear 
specification leads to good predictions in the middle ranges of the utility function [13]. 
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The marginal rate of substitution (MRS) between two attributes k and m is given by  
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Denoting the m-th attribute as price, MRS indicates the marginal WTP for attribute k. 
The deterministic part of the model is usually estimated by logit and probit techniques, de-
pending on the assumption being made on the distribution of the error terms. In a DCE, par-
ticipants are usually presented with a sequence of choices, which gives the underlying data a 
panel structure, thus making a random-effects specification appropriate. For a more detailed 
explanation of discrete choice models and their applications, see [13] or [19]. 
3. Reliability and validity issues 
Reliability and validity of WTP values are an important issue with regard to stated preference 
elicitation methods such as DCEs. Following Jöreskog and Goldberger [20] (see also [21]), let 
y1 and y2 denote two measurements of a latent variable x. Since the determinants of x (ne-
glected in eq. (6) below for simplicity) may change between the two observations, x in general 
will have unobserved values x1 and x2. However, measurements may be contaminated by an 
irrelevant latent influence z as wells as measurement errors  and . In the present context, 
y
1e 2e
1 and y2 are ‘observed’ (calculated) WTP values, while x is the marginal rate of substitution 
defined in eq. (5) that may differ between subsamples (x1 ≠ x2). However, by the maintained 
hypothesis, x  should not be a function of e.g. political attitudes z. Therefore, observations are 
generated according to the measurement model 
222222111111      , ezyyezxy ++=++= μλμλ , (6) 
with (λ1, μ1, λ2, μ2) denoting the loadings of measurements on latent variables and (e1, e2) sto-
chastic i.i.d. measurement errors. 
There are several sources of systematic error. Relevant product attributes may not have been 
recognized (the x vector is too short to begin with), seemingly irrelevant attributes may have 
been excluded (the x vector has been erroneously shortened), or the underlying indirect utility 
function may have been wrongly specified (the structural model determining x is wrong). 
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Random measurement errors are always present; in DCEs, they are even part of the specifica-
tion based on the random utility model [see eq.(3)]. 
Reliability can then be defined as the reproducibility of results on average, which means that 
loadings should have the same values across samples (λ1 = λ2, μ1 = μ2) and random errors be 
zero on expectation, ( ) 0)( 21 == eEeE . There are several ways to check for reliability (see e.g. 
[22]). The test-retest method benefits from repeated measurement; in that case, eq. (6) applies 
directly. Parallel testing involves the simultaneous use of two slightly different instruments; 
in this case, y1 and y2 are two different indicators with loadings λ1 ≠ λ2, that differ in a predict-
able way provided μ1 = μ2 = const. Finally, in the alternate-form method, the sample is split, 
with part of the observations reserved for re-estimation using a variant of the measurement 
method. Here, y1 and y2 refer to the two segments of the sample that again should induce load-
ings λ1 and λ2 that differ in a predictable way. 
With regard to reliability of DCE, there has been work on stability (of λ1, μ1, λ2, μ2) over time 
[23-24], using the same sample of respondents for two follow-up DCEs. Their test suggests 
temporal stability of the measurement model. Choice set design was examined in various 
studies on ordering effects, with mixed results. Some authors do not find evidence suggesting 
that results depend on the ordering of sets [9,25], whereas others do find such evidence [11]. 
Randomly changing the order of the choices respondents have to make therefore continues to 
be an accepted method of experiment design in order to avoid bias due to learning and fatigue 
effects [6]. Sensitivity to the choice of attribute range and attribute levels as well as to the 
order of presentation of attributes has been considered in several research papers [7,12,26-29]. 
Lloyd [30] gives an overview of the literature devoted to the analysis of the decision-making 
process and its influencing factors. There is considerable evidence that depending on ranges 
and levels of attributes, dominant preferences or lexicographic orderings are more or less 
likely to occur. 
The validity requirement is more stringent, requiring not only λ1 = λ2 w.r.t. indicators, but also 
μ1 = μ2 = 0 in eq. (6), i.e. the exclusion of irrelevant determinants of WTP. However, λ1 ≠ λ2 
or μ1 ≠ μ2 ≠ 0 is also admissible provided the maintained hypothesis makes a testable predic-
tion regarding these loadings, i.e. the relative quality of the two indicators. Thus, not only 
must measurement be reliable but also free of systematic (or at least uncontrolled) bias that 
could be caused by a variable z that is irrelevant by hypothesis. There exist different concepts 
of validity differing in requirements w.r.t. different populations and systematic measurement 
errors. In case of internal validity, the concept refers to the population studied in the experi-
ment. It hinges importantly on the confirmation of prior theoretical hypotheses. Thus, theo-
 5
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retical validity typically tests for the expected signs of coefficients suggested by economic 
theory, such as diminishing marginal utility of income and differences between socioeco-
nomic groups. Theoretical validity is a relatively weak concept since it may hold even though 
systematic error exists, as long as error is the same across socioeconomic groups (λ1 ≠ λ2 and 
μ1 = μ2 ≠ 0, where the subscripts 1 and 2 now refer to different socioeconomic groups). Thus, 
it is possible for a DCE to contain systematic error and yet produce theoretically valid results. 
Various health services researchers have tested for the theoretical validity of a DCE [5,9-
11,31-32]. In most cases, results are in accordance with theoretical expectations and hence 
indicate internal validity of DCE. 
External validity is a more generally defined concept. Given external validity, the results of a 
study can be generalized to different research methods, locations, groups of people, and deci-
sion-making situations. It requires the absence of systematic measurement error, i.e. 
μ1 = μ2 = 0. This condition is stronger than theoretical validity, which only requires the sys-
tematic error to be predictable in the light of (economic) theory. 
External validity may be further subdivided into convergent and criterion validity; both have 
been addressed in health care applications of DCE. Convergent validity obtains if different 
methods that are designed to generate information about the same theoretical construct x have 
convergent results (y1 ≈ y2). The comparator y2 should constitute a valid elicitation technique 
(‘gold standard’); thus λ1 = λ2 = 1 and μ1 = μ2 = 0 is required, although y1 and y2 are generated 
by different methods. Ryan [4] compares the results derived from a Contingent Valuation 
(CV) dichotomous choice study with those from a DCE concerning preferences for assisted 
reproductive techniques.1 However, there are doubts about the validity of CV (see e.g. [33-
34]). Therefore, conclusions w.r.t. the validity of a DCE may be unfounded. 
Criterion validity is considered the strongest form of validity. It obtains if the results of a me-
thod correspond with those from a decision-making situation that is external to the experi-
ment. For example, WTP calculated in a DCE can be compared to WTP implied by actual 
choices that provide the external criterion; in this case, an alternative with a known value of λ 
is available. Telser and Zweifel [35] compare WTP for hip protectors derived from a DCE 
with actual choices (that did not involve actual payment, however) the same respondents 
made later. The results indicate that the DCE may have criterion validity. 
The present work addresses the issues of reliability and theoretical validity in a way that has 
to our knowledge not been considered in prior research. Here, two DCEs were carried out on 
two independent representative samples of the Swiss population. Each set of participants were 
 
1 Hanley et al. [2] give a literature overview for convergent validity in the environmental context. 
presented a series of health insurance contracts with different product characteristics, except 
for three overlapping attributes (the health insurance premium being one of them). Given reli-
ability and hence λ1 = λ2, μ1 = μ2 and ( ) 0)( 21 == eEeE , the WTP values derived for the over-
lapping attributes should be comparable in spite of the fact that experiment A otherwise re-
volved around more far-reaching changes than experiment B (which specifically contained 
Managed Care alternatives)  This would indicate the absence of framing effects. For a confir-
mation of theoretical validity, WTP measures should vary in both experiments between dif-
ferent socioeconomic groups in ways predicted by economic theory. However, differences 
between the outcomes of the two experiments can still be persistent, caused by systematic 
error [μ1 ≠ μ2 in eq. (6)]. Therefore, while WTP values derived from the two DCEs may differ 
in their levels, they would vary with determinants and across socioeconomic groups as pre-
dicted by economic theory. 
4. Experiment Design 
To elicit preferences of the Swiss residential population with regard to proposed changes in 
the health care system, two DCEs were designed featuring hypothetical insurance contracts. 
Their attributes should reflect the reforms that are debated at present by policy makers. These 
contract attributes were preselected in expert sessions with representatives of the Swiss health 
care system and their relevance checked in a pretest. The nine characteristics retained (plus 
PREMIUM as the price attribute) are listed in Table 1. With regard to those attributes that 
were not taken into account, participants were told that the status quo and the alternative were 
identical in this regards in order to avoid omitted variable bias in the econometric analysis. 
The possibilities considered are the following. In experiment A, free choice of physician is 
restricted to a list of contract providers (PHYSLIST). The list can be made up applying differ-
ent selection criteria, viz. cost, quality, or efficiency, defined as the quality-cost ratio (PHY-
SCOST, PHYSQUAL, and PHYSEFF). The number of hospitals available is reduced by clos-
ing small local hospitals in favor of larger centralized ones (HOSPITAL). At present, long-
term care is only partially covered by mandatory health insurance in Switzerland. The pro-
posed change comprises full coverage of long-term care, to be financed by those over 50 
years old (LTCARE). The current drug benefit is very comprehensive; it would be changed by 
excluding drugs for minor illnesses such as the common cold (MINOR) or reimbursing only 
the cheapest drug available, usually a generic (GENERICS). 
Experiment B was devoted to more conventional insurance parameters. The existing annual 
deductible (CHF 230 at the time, with 1 CHF = 0.8 US$ in 2004) and copayment (10 percent) 
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are varied (DEDUCTIBLE, COPAYMENT). The coverage of alternative medicine is ex-
panded or reduced compared to the status quo, in which only few therapies are covered 
(ALTMED). Access to innovative treatments (currently immediate after a decision by an ex-
pert committee) is delayed by two years after approval by official authorities (INNOVA-
TION). Finally, each insurance contract is characterized by an absolute change in the monthly 
insurance premium (PREMIUM). 
Table 1 Product attributes and levels in experiments A and B 
Attribute Labels Levels 1)
Experiment A 
List of contract providers PHYSLIST 
PHYSCOST 
PHYSQUAL 
PHYSEFF 
- Status quo: free choice of physician in the home canton 
- List of providers: Cost criterion, Quality criterion, Cost-quality (efficiency)  
criterion  
Centralization of hospitals HOSPITAL - Status quo: existing hospitals 
- Closing of local hospitals 
Long-term care LTCARE - Status quo: nursing care is only partially covered 
- Coverage of long-term care, financed by those aged over 50 
Medication for minor illnesses MINOR - Status quo: All drugs on the official list are reimbursed 
- Medications for minor diseases such as the common cold have to be 
paid out-of-pocket 
Experiment B   
Deductible DEDUCTIBLE - Status quo: CHF 230, 400, 600, 1,200, 1,500 per year 2) 
- CHF 0, 2,400, 4,800 per year 2)
Copayment COPAYMENT - Status quo: 10% (max. CHF 600) 2)
- 20% (max. CHF 700) 2)
Alternative medicine ALTMED - Status quo: some treatment methods are covered  
- Additional alternative treatment methods are covered  
- Fewer alternative treatment methods are covered 
Joint Attributes   
Generics GENERICS - Status quo: all drugs on the list are reimbursed  
- The cheapest product on the market is covered  
Innovation INNOVATION - Status quo: all treatment methods are covered as soon as they get 
approved  
- Innovative treatments are covered only two years after introduction  
Premium PREMIUM - Reduction of the monthly premium by CHF 10, 25, 60 2)
- Increase/ reduction of the monthly premium by +/- CHF 50, 25 or 10 2) 
(Experiment B) 
1) Coding for the dummy variables: status quo=0, alternative=1 (in the case of ALTMED: 0=fewer covered, 1=additional covered) 
2) 1 CHF=0.8 US$ at 2004 exchange rates 
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Such a high number of attributes, however, is cognitively too burdensome for respondents to 
evaluate [1,13]. For this reason, experiment A centers on Managed Care-related attributes 
(PHYSLIST, HOSPITAL, LTCARE, MINOR), while experiment B emphasizes more con-
ventional parameters of health insurance (DEDUCTIBLE, COPAYMENT, ALTMED).  
The attributes present in both experiments are delayed access to innovation (INNOVATION), 
restricted drug benefit (GENERICS), and the change in the monthly premium (PREMIUM). 
A price attribute is necessary to derive money WTA values.  
Even so, the total number of attributes and their levels combine for a very large number of 
scenarios, which would cause interviews of excessive lengths. In an environmental applica-
tion, Hanley et al. [2] found that increasing the number of choices influences parameter esti-
mates. In most studies in health care, the number of choices ranges from 9 to 16 per respon-
dent [1]. Using statistical design theory [36-38], the number of alternatives was reduced to 
obtain a fractional design that makes estimation of main effects and two-way interaction ef-
fects possible (so-called resolution 5 orthogonal design [39]). 
For experiment A, 40 alternatives were selected, for experiment B, 27. These alternatives 
were randomly assigned to 4 and 3 split samples, respectively. To obtain a set of 10 choices 
per person in each split sample, one choice was included twice in each sequence of experi-
ment B. This allows the answers of a given individual to be tested for consistency. These 10 
choices were presented in a random ordering to avoid responses being affected by learning 
and fatigue effects. Each alternative had to be evaluated against the status-quo insurance con-
tract. No opting-out possibility was provided in view of the fact that health insurance is man-
datory in Switzerland. 
The organization of Swiss health insurance facilitates conducting a choice experiment of this 
degree of complexity. Several elements of choice were introduced in 1996 as part of a reform. 
In the status quo of 2003, the insured could already choose between different levels of annual 
deductibles, with CHF 230 (US$ 184 at 2004 exchange rates) being the minimum, and be-
tween conventional fee-for-service and Managed Care alternatives. In addition, consumers 
can change their insurer every year, basically without bearing transaction costs. Insurance 
premiums differ between competing insurers and regions but are otherwise uniform across sex 
and age groups. About 80 percent of consumers have some kind of supplementary private 
insurance, which, however, must not cover legally prescribed cost sharing (viz., the CHF 230 
deductible plus 10 percent copayment on health care expenditure with an annual cap at CHF 
600). The Swiss are therefore familiar with choice options in their health insurance, which 
should make the experiments less hypothetical. 
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Realism is important because complexity and experience seem to influence preferences stated 
in a DCE [23,29,40-41]. If the elicitation task is too demanding, or if people are unfamiliar 
with the topic, preferences might be incomplete or unstable, being formed and adjusted in the 
course of the experiment [30,42]. Other studies suggest that the choice of the payment vehicle 
(e.g. tax or insurance premium) to represent the price attribute of a DCE may be critical [7]. 
The choice of an appropriate price variable and its range and levels to induce tradeoffs has 
also been discussed [12]. Moreover, recent research [43] finds that in a health-related context, 
it makes a difference whether or not respondents are reminded that the price is to be paid out 
of pocket rather than by the insurer. These issues, however, do not seem to be of much rele-
vance to the present study because the two experiments deal with insurance contracts, with 
Swiss consumers paying different premiums according to type of plan out of pocket. More-
over, plans impose copayments throughout.  
The two experiments were developed and implemented in a coordinated way in order to allow 
for a joint analysis of the data. The documentation materials accompanying the DCE were 
identical. Two representative telephone surveys with 1,000 persons aged over 25 years2 were 
conducted independently in the German and French parts of Switzerland during September 
2003. The procedure was in two steps due to the special character and information require-
ments of a DCE. In a first telephone contact, people were asked if they would be willing to 
take part in the study. Those agreeing to participate received a package containing documen-
tation materials to make sure that all respondents had the same information about the Swiss 
health care system and knew the deductible level and premium of their health insurance plan. 
In this way, respondents were given time to reflect, which may result in more consistent 
choices during the experiment [44].  
For the actual DCE, each respondent received 11 decision cards. One (blue) card described 
the status quo with regard to the attributes to be varied in the experiment. The remaining 10 
(yellow) cards described the 10 alternative insurance contracts respondents had to opt for or 
against. Attributes were described in detail including a glossary.3 The experiments themselves 
were conducted during a later telephone contact. Respondents also answered additional ques-
tions concerning their utilization of health care services, overall satisfaction with the health 
care system, insurer and insurance policy, and their attitudes towards innovation in health 
 
2 Below age 26, reduced premiums for young adults and children apply. 
3 See also [31] on the importance of a-priori information for consistency of choices in DCE. The authors propose 
a summary sheet describing attributes and their levels. Such a sheet was provided in both experiments A and B. 
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insurance. Socioeconomic variables included age, sex, education, total household income, 
place of residence, occupation, and household size. 
5. Results 
5.1 Descriptive statistics 
Table 2 provides information on the socioeconomic characteristics of the two samples, show-
ing that they are very similar. In both samples, one-half of respondents are male, and mean 
age is 48 years. Monthly per capita income is about CHF 3,000 (1 CHF=0.8 US$ at 2004 ex-
change rates). Respondents live in a household averaging 2.5 persons and pay a monthly pre-
mium of CHF 222 (sample A) and CHF 240 (sample B), respectively. The mean annual de-
ductible is about CHF 650 for both samples, with an overrepresentation of those individuals 
having chosen the highest possible deductible (CHF 1,500), compared to official statistics. 
Table 2 Descriptive statistics of the two samples 
 Sample A Sample B 
 Mean Std.dev. Median Mean Std.dev. Median 
Sex (Dummy, male=1) 0.51 0.50 1 0.49 0.50 0 
Age 
25-40 (Dummy) 
Over 62 (Dummy) 
48.27 
0.39 
0.24 
16.13 
0.489 
0.428 
45 
0 
0 
48.85 
0.36 
0.21 
15.27 
0.48 
0.41 
47 
0 
0 
Language (Dummy, French=1) 0.29 0.455 0 0.30 0.46 0 
Monthly income (CHF p.c.)  2938 1783 2400 2952 1842 2400 
Household size 2.54 1.33 2 2.59 1.36 2 
Insurance premium (CHF) 221 65 217 240 69 218 
Deductible (CHF) 635 510 400 656 510 400 
Hospital stay (Dummy, yes=1)1) 0.16 0.36 0 0.11 0.32 0 
Physician visit (Dummy yes=1) 1) 0.57 0.50 1 0.49 0.50 0 
1) Previous 12 months (A) and 6 months (B), respectively. 
 
Another point of interest for the present study is actual willingness to change health insurer or 
type of contract. No less than 77 percent of the respondents in both samples stated that they 
had not changed their insurer during the past 5 years, and 64 (B: 66) percent had not under-
taken a change of their insurance contract, such as switching to a different deductible or to a 
Managed Care option. Therefore, a preference for the status quo is expected to characterize 
both experiments. So-called status quo bias is also likely in view of the rather short time since 
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the introduction of choice elements and the uncertainty surrounding future health care utiliza-
tion [45]. 
The overall results from the DCEs do point to limited flexibility in choice behavior. Out of the 
10,000 possible choices per experiment, only 21 (experiment A) and 18 percent (experiment 
B) were made in favor of the alternative. Moreover, these figures might mask the fact that few 
individuals make up for them. However, the evidence does not support this suspicion since no 
less than 65 percent (A) and 60 percent (B) of the respondents deviated from their status quo 
at least once.  
On the other hand, respondents of higher age, female sex, with a lower education level, and 
with a lower initial premium are less likely to prefer the alternative at least once. To avoid 
selection bias in the results,  these ‘non-traders’ (making up 35 and 40 percent of the samples, 
respectively) are not dropped from the analysis [5]. There are at least three explanations for 
the ‘non-traders’ phenomenon. First, the levels of the attributes offered in the experiment may 
not have been extreme enough to induce a trade-off between attributes; second, the attributes 
may not have been sufficiently valued by respondents; and finally, respondents may have 
simply made errors. However, this last explanation can be discarded on two counts. The con-
sistency check of experiment B shows that only 13 out of 1,000 individuals made ‘incorrect’ 
and inconsistent decisions, and 81 percent of respondents in sample A (88 percent in B) stated 
that they found the experiment easy or rather easy to accomplish. 
5.2 Estimation Results 
5.2.1 Estimation of a simple linear model 
To begin with, a simple model (Model 1) is estimated for both experiments. Here, the utility 
function is assumed to be the same linear one for all individuals, with the attributes of the 
health insurance contract as described in Table 1 as its sole arguments. For the deductible, a 
quadratic term was included to account for a decreasing marginal utility of income. For the 
premium, the same argument applies in principle; however, preliminary tests showed the 
squared value of PREMIUM to be statistically insignificant. 
Model 1 provides a first benchmark since almost every application of DCEs in the health care 
field uses this specification. The estimation results for the two scenarios are shown in the ap-
pendix. With the exception of the two attributes describing a restricted access to drugs in ex-
periment A (GENERICS and MINOR), all coefficients are statistically significant and have 
expected signs. Since the two overlapping attributes amount to restrictions compared to the 
status quo, their valuation is given by willingness-to-accept (WTA), or compensation de-
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manded, rather than WTP values.4 Therefore, the WTA values in Table 3 indicate the money 
amount of compensation that is necessary on average for respondents to accept a less gener-
ous plan. 
In experiment A, accepting a physician list based on a cost criterion (PHYSCOST) requires 
the highest compensation of CHF 103, more than one-third of the average monthly premium 
of CHF 270 (as of 2003, according to official statistics). By way of contrast, the exclusion of 
medications of minor ailments from reimbursement (MINOR) might even meet with a nega-
tive WTA, i.e. a positive WTP value. This may well be due to a ‘warm-glow’ effect [48-49], 
which occurs when respondents believe that a particular alternative meets with approval by 
society. 
Nonetheless, the difference between the WTA values for PHYSCOST, PHYSQUAL, PHY-
SEFF, and HOSPITAL on the one hand and MINOR on the other constitutes a first piece of 
evidence suggesting theoretical validity. After all, the restriction of choice implied by MI-
NOR, being far less important then the restrictions imposed by PHYSCOST, PHYSQUAL, 
PHYSEFF, and HOSPITAL, should be associated with a smaller (and possibly even zero) 
WTA. The mean values and confidence intervals (which are disjoint, pointing to significant 
differences) within experiment A confirm this prediction. Second, MINOR and GENERICS 
both concern drug use only and should therefore have similar WTA values given validity. 
This prediction is borne out as well.  
In experiment B, both a higher deductible (DEDUCTIBLE) and an increase of the rate of co-
payment from 10 to 20 percent (COPAYMENT) clearly require compensation to be accepted. 
Since the first change is defined in terms of CHF 1, it entails a minimal increase in financial 
risk and therefore should be associated with a much smaller WTA value than the latter. This is 
confirmed, providing evidence for theoretical validity. 
 
 
4 Typically, WTA values for restrictions from an existing level are much higher than WTP values for a corre-
sponding improvement from a lower level (see e.g. [46]Horowitz and McConnell, 2002 and [47]Zweifel et al., 
2006). 
Table 3 WTA derived from Model 1 (attributes only), in CHF per month  
 WTA Std.err. 1) z value 95% confidence interval 
Experiment A      
PHYSCOST 103.28 13.16 7.85 77.49 129.06 
PHYSQUAL 53.33 8.85 6.03 35.98 70.67 
PHYSEFF 41.96 7.78 5.39  26.71 57.21 
HOSPITAL 37.30 5.67 6.58  26.18  48.42 
LTCARE 24.90 4.76 5.24  15.57  34.22 
MINOR -6.47 5.33 -1.21  -16.92 3.97 
GENERICS 2.67 5.49 0.49 -8.08 13.43 
INNOVATION 64.64 7.88 8.20 49.19 80.09 
Experiment B      
DEDUCTIBLE 2) 0.0320 0.0017 20.60 0.0314 0.038 
COPAYMENT 18.91 2.98 6.34 13.06 24.75 
ALTMED 3) -24.71 3.11 -7.96 -30.80 -18.63 
GENERICS 13.77 3.06 4.50 7.77 19.77 
INNOVATION 38.39 3.33 11.54 31.87 44.91 
1) Standard errors computed by the delta method.  
2) Compensation required for a CHF 1 increase in the annual deductible for the mean individual with a deductible of CHF 656. 
3) Expanded coverage of alternative medicine (0=no inclusion). 
1 CHF=0.8 US$  at  2004 exchange rates 
 
Turning to the two overlapping attributes INNOVATION and GENERICS, their WTA values 
are ordered in a sensible way in both experiments. After all, delaying access to medical inno-
vation by two years entails a larger risk than settling for generics (which are supposed to be 
chemically equivalent to original products). However, absolute WTA values differ substan-
tially between experiments (see Figure 1). In experiment A, the WTA value for GENERICS is 
not distinguishable from zero, while in experiment B,  it is significantly positive (CHF 14) . 
Yet the two 95% confidence intervals overlap, suggesting that the hypothesis of equality be-
tween the two experiments need not be rejected.  
On the other hand, WTA values for INNOVATION are clearly positive in both experiments. 
But they differ, the 95% confidence intervals being disjunct. This is a first indication of lack-
ing validity. Finally, Figure 1 reveals that the WTA values of experiment B are much more 
precisely estimated than those of experiment A, especially for INNOVATION. As there is no 
reason for the variance of random errors [Var(eA), Var(eB)] to systematically differ between 
experiments, this points to the possibility that , a systematic error introduced by the 
B
BA μμ ≠
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presence of strongly differing other attributes in the two experiments [see eq. (6), with sub-
scripts 1 and 2 replaced by A and B]. 
 
Figure 1  Distribution of WTA for GENERICS (left) and INNOVATION (right) in experiments A and B 
(Model 1) 
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5.2.2 Estimation of more comprehensive models 
A first generalization of Model 1 is to allow interactions between attributes, relaxing the as-
sumption of an additively separable utility function. This implies that WTP values become 
conditional on the values assumed by the other attributes in the respective experiment. There-
fore, a comparison of WTA values pertaining to GENERICS and INNOVATION are only 
possible in the status quo. While significant interaction terms popped up here and there, it 
proved impossible to find a common specification for both experiments due to collinearity 
problems. Moreover, in experiment-specific estimations, WTP values of attributes turned out 
to be similar to those of Model 1 when evaluated at the status quo. For these reasons, this 
generalization was not pursued any further. 
Next, the assumption that all respondents have the same utility function needs to be relaxed. 
Specifically, marginal utilities of attributes are now permitted to vary with socioeconomic 
characteristics of the respondents. This calls for introducing interaction terms in the econo-
metric estimation. Two interaction models were estimated. The first one (Model 2) follows 
Johnson and Desvouges [50] by interacting the price attribute (here: PREMIUM) with socio-
economic characteristics, thus allowing for different marginal utilities of income between 
subgroups. The second interaction model (Model 3) goes one step further by letting the mar-
ginal utility not only of the price attribute but of all product attributes differ between socio-
economic groups. This comprehensive specification is best capable of capturing preference 
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heterogeneities. The socioeconomic characteristics included in Models 2 and 3 are age, gen-
der, region (German- or French-speaking part of Switzerland), income, household size, health 
status, and initial level of premium paid. 
For Model 2, WTA values relating to the two overlapping attributes are shown in Table 4. 
WTA values for the mean individual are close to those of Model 1 for both experiments, 
which was to be expected since a predominantly linear model works best for mean values. 
 
Table 4 WTA derived from Model 2 (interactions with PREMIUM only), in CHF per month,  
evaluated at the mean individual of the estimation sample 
 WTA Std.err. 1) z value 95% confidence interval 
GENERICS      
Experiment A 3.28 5.90 0.56 -8.28 14.84 
Experiment B 10.94 3.46 3.17 4.17 17.72 
INNOVATION      
Experiment A 69.21 8.97 7.72 51.64 86.78 
Experiment B 31.80 7.51 4.24 17.08 46.51 
1) Standard errors computed by the delta method. 
1 CHF=0.8 US$  at  2004 exchange rates 
   
 
Again, the hypothesis of equal WTA with regard to GENERICS cannot be rejected, the over-
lap between the two distributions being even more marked than in Model 1 (compare Fig-
ures 2 and 1, left-hand side). By way of contrast, Model 2 results in a WTA value for INNO-
VATION that is clearly larger in experiment A than in experiment B (see the divergent distri-
butions in Figure 2, right-hand side). This is still compatible with theoretical validity in view 
of consistently higher WTA values for INNOVATION than GENERICS in both experiments. 
The fact that this relative ordering of WTA values results from both Model 1 and Model 2 
points to robustness of results. Their divergence, however, could be a sign of systematic error 
in either one of the experiments or in both [μ1 ≠ μ2 ≠ 0 in eq. (6)]. 
 
 Figure 2  Distribution of WTA for GENERICS (left) and INNOVATION (right) in experiments A and B 
(Model 2) 
 
As to Model 3 with its full set of interaction terms, INNOVATION continues to command a 
higher WTA than GENERICS in both experiments, suggesting theoretical validity. There is 
again an indication that WTA values might diverge between the two samples. However, the 
95% confidence intervals are [-9.37; 13.68] for GENERICS in experiment A and  
[-2.61; 43.25] in experiment B, suggesting that the equality hypothesis need not be rejected 
(see also Figure 3, left-hand side). This  outcome is due to a marked increase of estimated 
standard errors in Model 3, especially for experiment B (compare Figures 2 and 3), likely 
caused by multicollinearity between the many interaction terms. In the case of INNOVA-
TION, intervals are [50.32; 84.32] in A and [4.65; 41.49] in B. Here, intervals do not overlap, 
suggesting rejection of the equality hypothesis.  
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 Figure 3  Distribution of WTA for GENERICS (left) and INNOVATION (right) in experiments A and B  
(Model 3) 
 
On the whole, large standard errors limit the usefulness of Model 3 for an assessment of reli-
ability but also of theoretical validity because WTA values tend not to differ according to so-
cioeconomic characteristics in a significant way. Therefore, the following tests of reliability 
and theoretical validity are based on Model 2 (interaction terms with PREMIUM only), with 
results displayed in Table 5. These tests revolve around differences between socioeconomic 
groups, using the concepts introduced in section 3. Recall that for theoretical validity, WTA 
values may be biased overall, yet reflect differences between socioeconomic groups ade-
quately in both experiments, i.e. λ1 ≠ λ2 and μ1 = μ2 ≠ 0 in equation (6). 
Indeed, WTA values can be shown to differ between socioeconomic groups in a way pre-
dicted by economic theory while diverging between experiments A and B. This contributes 
evidence in favor of theoretical validity but persistence of a systematic bias in at least one 
experiment. 
Age: Demand for health insurance coverage may rise with age because the asset ‘health’ to be 
protected becomes more risky. However, the value of this asset decreases beyond the earnings 
peak in the life cycle [51-52]. Therefore, the relationship between age and WTA concerning 
restrictions in coverage is ambiguous, precluding a test for theoretical validity. In Table 5, the 
compensation required tends to increase with age in both experiments. With regard to system-
atic bias, experiment A consistently yields smaller WTA values for GENERICS than experi-
ment B in all age categories. In the case of INNOVATION, it is the other way around, with 
WTA values in experiment A exceeding by far those in B. Again, confidence intervals clearly 
overlap for GENERICS; therefore the equality hypothesis need not be rejected. These find-
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ings do not hold for INNOVATION, pointing to systematic bias [i.e. inappropriate influence 
from one or several z variables in eq. (6)] in the case of INNOVATION.  
 
Table 5 WTA derived from Model 2 (interactions with PREMIUM only), in CHF per month  
evaluated at the mean individual of the socioeconomic group 
 WTA GENERICS WTA INNOVATION 
 Experiment A Experiment B Experiment A Experiment B 
 Mean 95%  CI 1) Mean 95% CI 1) Mean 95%  CI 1) Mean 95%  CI 1)
Age         
25-39 -2.24 -5.64, 10.11 11.02 5.99; 16.04 47.21 36.40; 58.02 32.01 26.03; 38.00 
40-62 3.57 -9.05, 16.18 13.27 7.14; 19.41 75.29 48.47; 102.11 38.57 31.08; 46.05 
63+ 10.21 -28.04, 48.46 18.27 8.92; 27.62 215.53 44.94; 475.99 53.09 38.22; 67.96 
Sex         
Male 4.50 -11.45, 20.44 13.57 7.29; 19.85 94.94 56.45; 133.42 39.44 31.94; 46.94 
Female 2.60 -6.56; 11.75 12.62 6.85; 18.39 54.84 41.48; 68.24 36.68 29.86; 43.50 
Region         
French 4.84 -12.40; 22.07 15.23 7.99; 22.46 102.14 49.23; 155.04 44.25 24.44; 54.05 
German 2.93 -7.34; 13.26 12.34 6.71; 17.94 61.87 46.48; 77.25 35.83 29.46; 42.19 
Health         
Ill 5.06 -12.97; 23.09 14.55 7.82; 21.29 106.78 49.93; 163.63 42.29 34.09; 50.50 
Healthy 2.85 -7.20; 12.90 11.71 6.36; 17.06 60.18 45.51; 74.84 34.04 27.82; 40.25 
1)  95% confidence intervals (standard errors computed using the delta method). 
1 CHF=0.8 US$ at 2004 exchange rates 
 
Sex: Women have lower levels of wealth, implying a lower effective demand for safety ce-
teris paribus.5 Their WTA for restrictions of coverage in health insurance should therefore be 
lower. This prediction tends to be borne out; however confidence intervals especially in ex-
periment A are too wide for statistical significance and hence support of theoretical validity. 
Region: Cultural differences between the French- and German-speaking regions are likely to 
swamp any prediction that could be derived e.g. from income differences. A test for theoreti-
cal validity thus does not seem possible. Table 5 indeed shows WTA values for both GENER-
ICS and INNOVATION to be higher in the French-speaking part of Switzerland. This effect 
is consistent across experiments. Again, confidence intervals overlap for GENERICS while 
this is hardly the case for INNOVATION, indicating presence of systematic error. 
                                                 
5 Due to imprecise and partially missing income data of the respondents it was not possible to adequately derive 
WTA w.r.t. income. 
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Health: Certainly, the asset ‘health’ must have been more at risk among those reporting an 
illness during the past 12 months compared to the others, and possibly financial wealth as 
well to the extent that having consulted a physician or visited a hospital during the previous 
months entailed a copayment. Those having experienced illness are therefore predicted to 
demand a higher compensation for restrictions of health insurance coverage, especially con-
cerning access to medical innovation. This prediction tends to be confirmed by the entries of 
Table 5, lending some support to theoretical validity. There are again strong indications of 
differing WTA values for INNOVATION between experiments. 
Overall, the attribute INNOVATION seems to be affected by systematic bias across all socio-
economic groups. The attribute GENERICS displays results that are sufficiently similar be-
tween the two experiments to conclude that the DCEs exhibit theoretical validity and  reliabil-
ity.  
6 Discussion and Conclusion 
This paper reports on the results of two independent discrete-choice experiments (DCEs) 
seeking to measure the willingness-to-accept (WTA) values concerning restrictions in Swiss 
health insurance and health care, based on 1,000 interviews each conducted in 2003. Experi-
ment A presented respondents with alternative health insurance contracts emphasizing Man-
aged Care elements (physician lists, restricted choice of hospital) and compulsory long-term 
care insurance (see Table 1). Experiment B focused on more conventional and familiar health 
insurance parameters such as the annual deductible and the rate of copayment. The distin-
guishing feature of this study is the fact that the two experiments have three attributes in 
common, viz., a drug benefit limited to generics (GENERICS), delayed access to medical 
innovation (INNOVATION), and the price attribute (PREMIUM). This setup permits testing 
for reliability and validity. 
With regard to (theoretical) validity, results yielded negative estimated marginal utilities for 
all restrictions in both experiments, as predicted. However, some of the implied WTA values 
do not differ from zero. Among the overlapping attributes, a reasonable prediction is that 
WTA for INNOVATION should be higher than for GENERICS because the first restriction 
may be binding in a situation when survival is at stake. This prediction tends to be borne out 
in both experiments, although the difference fails to be statistically significant. Additional 
testing becomes possible in a more general model allowing for WTA values to depend on 
socioeconomic characteristics (Model 2). Specifically, men (having more wealth) and the ill 
(being exposed to higher risk with regard to health and possibly wealth) should exhibit higher 
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WTA values than women and the healthy, respectively. Also, the ill/healthy differential 
should be more marked for INNVATION than for GENERICS. Whereas these predictions 
receive some empirical support in both experiments, conventional statistical significance lev-
els fail to be attained. 
Turning to reliability, the evidence comes from comparisons between experiments A and B. 
For GENERICS, experiment A yields lower estimated WTA values than experiment B; for 
INNOVATION, the reverse is true. This pattern holds also within different socioeconomic 
groups (Model 2). However, the 95 percent confidence intervals are too wide to cause rejec-
tion of the hypothesis that the WTA values for GENERICS are in fact equal, i.e. that they 
seem to be reliable. This does not hold with regard to the WTA values for INNOVATION, 
which seem to be distinct across the two experiments, likely indicating presence of a system-
atic bias. 
The explanation may be that experiment A involved alternatives that are more hypothetical 
than in experiment B. Indeed, the attributes of experiment A are mostly of a general nature, 
with in the degree of restriction little specified (PHYSLIST, HOSPITAL, LTCARE; see 
Table 1). Experiment B on the other hand contained mostly attributes that respondents were 
familiar with; moreover, the restrictions, being in terms of money, were well defined (DE-
DUCTIBLE, COPAYMENT). However, Lack of concreteness in alternatives presented has 
been found to lead to a loss of precision in parameter estimates [13,53]. Indeed, the WTA 
values shown in Table 5 do exhibit larger confidence intervals for INNOVATION than for 
GENERICS in both experiments. 
This explanation is compatible with the following observation. In 2003, respondents were 
already familiar with generics. In Switzerland, in intensive debate had revolved around the 
drug bill burdening social health insurance for quite a while. Opinion polls show increasing 
approval of the proposal to substitute cheaper generics for original branded drugs. By way of 
contrast, access to medical innovation does not refer to specific new treatments or new drugs. 
Furthermore,  medical innovations are about future options, which are uncertain. For this rea-
son, experiment A may have produced not only biased but also less reliable WTA estimates 
for Managed Care-type attributes and INNOVATION in particular. A full 19 percent of the 
respondents in experiment A had some difficulties in making their choices, compared to 11 
percent in experiment B. It is therefore possible that in experiment A (despite the prior infor-
mation on attributes provided), respondents’ preferences were incomplete and may have been 
formed or adjusted during the course of the experiment. In this case, WTA (or WTP) values 
depend on the attribute set chosen, undermining validity. 
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In conclusion, theoretical validity tends to receive empirical support in both experiments in all 
cases where economic theory makes predictions concerning differences between socioeco-
nomic groups. However, in a comparison between the two experiments, validity must be re-
jected in one of two cases. A systematic inappropriate influence on measured WTA seems to 
be present in at least one experiment. This is likely experiment A, where respondents were far 
less familiar with proposed alternatives than in experiment B. In conclusion, measuring pref-
erences for major, little-known innovations in a reliable way seems to present particular chal-
lenges for experimental research. 
 
7 Appendix 
Table 6 Estimation results for the linear model, Experiment A 
Variable Coefficient  Std. err. z value P > |z| 
PHYSCOST -0.9085349 *** 0.054660 -16.62 0.000 
PHYSQUAL -0.4691062 *** 0.052087 -9.01 0.000 
PHYSEFF -0.3691041 *** 0.053688 -6.87 0.000 
INNOVATION -0.5686612 *** 0.038207 -14.88 0.000 
GENERICS -0.0235289  0.048101 -0.49 0.625 
MINOR 0.0569549  0.046406 1.23 0.220 
NURSING -0.219003 *** 0.038198 -5.73 0.000 
HOSPITAL -0.3281199 *** 0.037891 -8.66 0.000 
PREMIUM -0.008797 *** 0.000983 -8.95 0.000 
CONSTANT -0.5124295 *** 0.079204 -6.47 0.000 
σu 1.052211  0.039998   
ρ 0.5254248 *** 0.018957   
Number of observations = 9850 
χ2 (9) = 573.65; Prob > χ2  = 0.0000 
Likelihood ratio test of ρ = 0: χ2 (1) = 1487.86; Prob > = χ2  = 0.000 
(**, ***) Coefficients different from zero with error probabilities of 5% (1%, 0.1%). 
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Table 7 Estimation results for the linear model, Experiment B 
Variable Coefficient  Std. err. z value P > |z| 
DEDUCT 1) -0.000565 *** 0.0000303 -18.64 0.000 
DEDUCT2 3.80e-08 *** 7.88e-09 4.82 0.000 
COPAYMENT -0.270581 *** 0.0428204 -6.32 0.000 
ALTMED 2) 0.353708 *** 0.0419784 8.43 0.000 
GENERICS -0.197095 *** 0.0421067 -4.68 0.000 
INNOVATION -0.549415 *** 0.0480711 -11.43 0.000 
PREMIUM -0.014312 *** 0.0006055 -23.63 0.000 
CONSTANT -0.000565 *** 0.0000303 -18.64 0.000 
σu 0.902244  0.040346   
ρ 0.448746 *** 0.022124   
Number of observations = 9569 
χ2 (7) = 1296.2 > χ2  = 0.0000 
Likelihood ratio test of ρ = 0: χ2 (1) = 745.05 > = χ2  = 0.000 
(**, ***) Coefficients different from zero with  with error probabilities of 5% (1%, 0.1%). 
1) Compensation in Swiss francs required for a 1CHF increase in the annual deductible. 
2) Expanded coverage of alternative medicine (status quo=no inclusion). 
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